Recent studies find that cash remains a dominant payment choice for small-value transactions despite the prevalence of alternative means of payment such as debit and credit cards. For policy makers an important question is whether consumers truly prefer using cash or merchants restrict card usage. Using the Bank of Canada's 2009 Method of Payment Survey, we estimate a generalized multinomial logit model of payment choices to extract individual heterogeneity (demand-side factors) while controlling for merchants' acceptance of cards (supply-side factors). Based on a counterfactual exercise where we assume universal card acceptance among merchants, we find that some consumers would decrease their cash usage but the magnitude of this decrease is small. Our results imply that the use of cash in small-value transactions is driven mainly by consumers' preferences.
Introduction
In recent years, consumers' method of payment choice has attracted the attention of a wide range of private firms -credit-card-issuing companies, credit and debit network providers, and mobile phone companies -as well as researchers and policy makers, as new payment technologies, such as mobile payments and contactless credit cards, have been developed. Despite the emergence of these new technologies, cash retains its dominant position at the point-of-sale, in particular, for small-value transactions.
This phenomenon is found all over the world. For example, recent studies on consumer micro-payments by Klee (2008) and Arango, Huynh, and Sabetti (2011) reveal that the dominant payment method in Canada and the U.S. respectively, is cash, for transactions under 25 dollars. At the same time, these authors also report that the use of credit and debit cards increases as the transaction values increase. Similar findings are also documented by Bolt, Jonker, and van Renselaar (2010) and Simon, Simith, and West (2010) for the Netherlands and Australia, respectively. This dominance of cash usage for small-value transactions at the point-of-sale might be partially supply driven: To avoid interchange fees, merchants tend not to accept credit or debit cards for small-value transactions.
1 At the same time, however, it might be demand driven: Many consumers prefer paying in cash for its ease of use and the speed of settlements. 2 Such observations bring up the following question: How would consumers pay at the point-of-sale if the government regulated merchant fees of credit and debit cards to a very low level so that all merchants would be willing to accept any cards? Answering this question is challenging because it is difficult to separately identify supply-side and demand-side factors in payment choices. The distinction is, however, essential for understanding the mechanism of demand for cash and for answering various policy-oriented and/or marketing-related questions.
This paper attempts to answer these questions by estimating a model of consumers' payment choice at the point-of-sale, using unique Canadian data based on three days of shopping diaries. The data have two key features: multiple observations per sub-ject, and "perceived" acceptance. First, since the survey keeps track of the shopping diaries at the individual level, we can observe multiple transactions for each individual with slightly different shopping contexts, in terms of shopping types and transaction values. Observing only one transaction per subject would not be enough to identify the individual-specific effect of choosing a particular method of payment. In the data, however, we can observe multiple transactions for each individual, which enables us to extract consumer heterogeneity in payment choice. Second, consumers report the methods of payment that would have been accepted at each shopping opportunity, as well as the actual method of payment used. Although this self-reported information might contain measurement error and might not be perfectly exogenous, it is still useful to limit the consumers' choice sets. These two features of the data, as a result, enable us to separate the demand-side factors from the supply-side factors.
Payment choice is modelled as a generalized multinomial logit (G-MNL) model,
proposed by Fiebig, Keane, Louviere, and Wasi (2010) , to capture the heterogeneity observed in the data. A close look at the data shows that consumers can be potentially categorized into four groups: (i) consumers who only use cash (cash users), (ii) consumers who use debit cards whenever they are accepted and cash otherwise (debit users), (iii) consumers who use credit cards whenever they are accepted and cash otherwise (credit users), and (iv) consumers who use all three methods of payment (mixed users). This observation suggests that some sets of consumers have strong preferences for a particular method of payment, such as credit cards or debit cards, and use them as long as these methods are accepted by merchants.
Another type of heterogeneity in payment choice is the heterogeneous thresholds, meaning that some people within the same category might choose a different payment method even though they face the same transaction values and types. For example, some credit users might want to use credit cards even for a $5 transaction, whereas others might use credit cards only for transactions above $20. Similarly, within the category of mixed users, their payment choice between credit and debit cards might be quite random across individuals. This type of heterogeneity should also be captured. In the G-MNL model, we can capture such heterogeneity by introducing scale coefficients -scaling up/down the utility of one particular method of payment -and random coefficients -changing substitution patterns among alternatives.
The importance of such consumer heterogeneity in payment choices is confirmed in the estimation results. A series of estimation results shows that the parameters that govern individual heterogeneity are statistically and economically significant. Moreover, some information criteria, such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which show the measurement of the goodness of fit of a model, improve dramatically by including such heterogeneity.
Using the estimated model, we conduct a policy experiment where all merchants accept any payment method regardless of the transaction value. This policy experiment can be interpreted as follows: Suppose the government regulates merchant fees to a very low level so that all merchants are willing to accept credit and debit cards. In this case, every consumer could use his preferred method of payment at any merchant.
Would consumers still use cash?
We demonstrate that overall cash usage would decrease by about 7.7 percentage points in terms of transaction frequency and by 7.5 percentage points in terms of transaction values, whereas the model without any individual heterogeneity predicts smaller changes in terms of both transaction frequency and values. This difference can be explained as follows: Without taking into account individual heterogeneity, homogeneous consumers would not use cards so frequently for small-value transactions.
Taking into account individual heterogeneity, however, some people who truly prefer using credit and debit cards would use these cards even for small-value transactions under the counterfactual scenario, leading to the slightly larger decrease in overall cash usage. Moreover, the relatively smaller decreases in cash usage in any model can be also interpreted to mean that cash usage in small-value transactions is driven mainly by the demand side, i.e., consumers would not use cards so much, even though all merchants are willing to accept credit and debit cards.
Research on micro-payments has attracted attention from many sources: major retail stores, mobile phone companies, credit card companies, credit card network providers, commercial banks, policy makers, and central banks. Traditional payment methods -cash, and credit and debit cards -face increasing competition from newly emerging payment methods such as online payments and mobile phone payments. Because of the need to understand the substitution between these payment methods, many empirical studies, as well as some theoretical studies, attempt to reveal the sub-stitution between cash and credit and debit cards. 3 For example, Schuh and Stavins (2010) focus on the extinction of check usage in the U.S., while Ching and Hayashi (2010) , Simon, Simith, and West (2010) , Arango, Huynh, and Sabetti (2011), and Sieber (2011) examine the role that credit cards' reward programs play in the method of payment choice. Rysman (2007) asks why people use only one credit card, even though they have several other credit cards. Borzekowski, Kiser, and Ahmed (2008) and Zinman (2009) Wright and Telyukova (2008) , and the two-sided market approach, such as Rochet and Tirole (2002) , Rochet and Wright (2010) , and Shy and Wang (2011) . 4 For a more comprehensive survey, see Humphrey (2010) . 5 Originally, there were about 6,900 respondents to the survey questionnaire, and among them about 3300 respondents proceeded to the diary survey instrument. For this study, we need both sets of information and use the respondents who finished both.
number of free debit transactions per month, and credit card rewards and annual fees.
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SQ also contains some attitudinal information, such as perceptions of convenience and safety for some particular methods of payment. This study includes such attitudinal data as explanatory variables, since the importance of such attitudinal data is emphasized in Harris and Keane (1999) and Ching and Hayashi (2010) .
The diary survey instrument (hereafter DSI) asks about shopping data, including the transaction value, type of transaction, the perceived accepted methods of payment, the method of payment chosen, and the major reasons for their choice, for three consecutive days. There are two strengths of these data: (1) multiple observations per subject and (2) perceived acceptance. As for the first feature, the data provide multiple shopping observations for each individual with slightly different shopping opportunities, which allows us to study the source of individual heterogeneity. Compared with other studies using transaction-level (micro) data such as Klee (2008) Since the sample is not representative, we need to use a sample weight to correct the sampling bias. 7 Moreover, the analysis is restricted to the subset of the original samples. 8 We construct the sample by excluding consumers who have missing information regarding the perceived acceptance, demographics, and transaction value, which are key variables in this study. Moreover, in order to estimate a random effects model, we need to have at least three shopping observations per subject to identify the individual-specific effect. Thus, we also exclude the samples with fewer than three 6 In Canada, about half of bank accounts offer unlimited free debit card transactions, whereas the remaining bank accounts offer only limited free or zero free debit card transactions. For the latter type of accounts, consumers need to pay some fees after exceeding the limit on free debit card transactions. 7 For more details, see Arango, Huynh, and Sabetti (2011) and Arango and Welte (2012) . shopping observations. This process leaves a total of 1,452 individuals with 7,908 transactions. Figure 1 shows the frequency of payment choice by transaction value. The black solid line, the blue dotted line, and the red dashed line show the frequency of cash, credit card and debit card usage, respectively. For example, if the transaction value is about $10, then 60%, 25%, and 15% of transactions are completed by cash, debit and credit cards, respectively. Notice that if the transaction value is less than $25, cash usage dominates other payment methods, namely credit and debit cards, and this dominance is reversed as the transaction value increases, as Arango, Huynh, and Sabetti (2011) point out.
Canadian Payment Landscape
In the following subsection, we show some summary statistics and descriptive statistics to motivate why this study uses a generalized multinomial logit model, focusing on the heterogeneity in payment choices observed in the data. Table 1 shows how many shopping trips each individual made over the three days. The second and fifth, and the third and sixth columns display the unweighted and weighted The first and most important observation is the fact that the fractions of debit users and credit users are sizeable, accounting for one-third and one-fourth, respectively. This observation suggests that the substitution between credit and debit cards is very small for those committed users. Small changes in transaction values or in the characteristics of transactions are not necessarily enough for them to switch their payment methods from debit to credit or credit to debit. Thus, the model should take into account the individual-specific effects for their preferred payment methods.
Heterogeneity in Payment Choice
Second, there are some mixed users who use all three methods quite randomly. Although the average number of shopping trips is larger than the corresponding number for other types, the average transaction values for them are not so different from the Figure 3 . Thus, their preferences should be different from credit users preferences, which should be captured by the model.
As a final remark about Table 2 , the distribution of consumer types will be preserved if we limit the samples to consumers with more than 1 shopping opportunity. In order to extract individual-specific effects, e.g., fixed effect estimators and/or random effect estimators, each sample should have multiple observations for identification purposes.
Thus, to model the heterogeneity mentioned above, we need to discard the samples which do not have enough observations. To see not only the average but also the distribution of transaction values, we also show the distribution of transaction values depending on the type of consumer, demonstrated in Figure 2 . The average transaction values and the distribution of the transaction values for each type of consumer are quite similar to each other, implying that consumers with more than three shopping trips are still representative for each type of consumer. Therefore, we estimate the model using the samples with more than two shopping opportunities.
accepted. Similarly, they could use only cash and debit cards 255 times, and they could use only cash and credit cards 53 times; for the remaining 495 shopping trips, they could use all three methods.
According to Table 3 , we can see that the distributions of acceptance are different from each other depending on the type of consumer. For example, debit users are more likely to go to shops that accept debit cards than are credit users, and credit users are more likely to go to shops that accept credit cards than are debit users. However, the differences are quite small between credit users and mixed users. On the other hand, the distributions for cash users and debit users are slightly different from those for other types of people, i.e., they are more likely to go to shops that accept debit or credit cards than are other types of consumers. This difference suggests that there is a potential endogeneity problem, that is, people who prefer using cards might choose shops where these cards are more likely to be accepted. However, the relative number of cash users is small compared to other types, and the patterns of distribution of acceptance are similar to those for other types, i.e., the highest frequency occurs when both credit and debit cards are accepted, and the second highest frequency occurs at shops where neither is accepted, except for debit users. Therefore, this study treats all samples equally in the estimation and we further discuss the potential endogeneity problems in Section 4, together with other issues. Note: For each user, the first column # is the raw number and the second column % is the unweighted percentage. Similarly, the right graph shows the 3-dimensional histogram of consumers perception of record keeping facility for credit and debit cards relative to cash.
Attitudinal and Other Demographic Variables
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to rate the usage of cash, credit cards, and debit cards for (1) the ease of use, and (2) record keeping capabilities, using a five-point scale, e.g., a respondent needs to choose a number from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 5 (strongly agree) to rate the ease of use for each method of payment. We normalize those two ratings by cash. That is, each index for credit card and debit card usage is obtained by
where r i,j,l is the rating of individual i for payment method j, j = credit and debit, and l denotes the ease of use or record keeping. Taking logarithm normalizes the indexes so that a i,j,l can take a value between −1.6094 to 1.6094, and 0 if payment method j is identical to cash.
Figures 4 and 5 graphically show the respondents' attitudinal and perceptual data, using 3-dimensional histograms. For example, Figure 4 shows that many respondents are located at the center, at the point of (0, 0), implying most of them think the ease of use for all three methods are the same. On the other hand, Figure 5 shows that many respondents are located north of (0, 0), implying that credit and debit cards are more convenient as a record keeping device than cash.
Econometric Model
This section provides a payment choice model for consumers. As indicated in Section 2, consumers' payment choice is a discrete outcome variable. Thus, given the discrete nature of the data and motivated by some patterns observed in Section 2, this paper uses a generalized multinomial logit model, as proposed by Fiebig, Keane, Louviere, and Wasi (2010) .
11 As a benchmark case, we also estimate a series of multinomial logit models to compare the estimation results and statistical fitness of the model.
Payment Choice Model
Suppose the utility function for individual i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , at shopping trip t, t = 1, 2, · · · , T i , from choosing payment method j ∈ J it is given by:
where α j is a payment method specific constant term,
] is a coefficient vector, and ε ijt is an i.i.d. random utility shock that follows a Type I extreme value distribution.
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Each individual i chooses a payment method j which gives the highest utility at shopping trip t. As a matter of convention, the utility from using cash is normalized as zero, 11 There exist other approaches: semiparametric and nonparametric approaches. For example, after the pioneering work of Manski (1975) , Briesch, Chintagunta, and Matzkin (2002) use a semi-parametric method, known as maximum score estimator, to extract unobserved heterogeneity in discrete choice models. More recently, Fox (2007) shows that the semiparametric estimator is consistent when using data on a subset of choices. Similarly, Briesch, Chintaguanta, and Matzkin (2010) use nonparametric approach to extract unobserved heterogeneity in discrete choice models.
12 As Fiebig, Keane, Louviere, and Wasi (2010) point out, a choice specific constant term, α j , cannot be individual-specific, i.e., we cannot identify when α j is replaced by α ij . This problem is known as "incidental parameter problem," studied by Neyman and Scott (1948) and thus we explicitly write α j separately from other characteristics. For more details, see Lancaster (2000) which is a comprehensive survey of this issue. Moreover, a recent study by Fox, il Kim, Ryan, and Bajari (2012) shows that the distribution of the random coefficients in the multinomial logit model is nonparametrically identified, and we can straightforwardly apply their identification argument to this model.
i.e., we assume that u i,cash,t = 0. For notational simplicity, we use
which gives us a standard notation of the utility:
Though β i may depend on a payment method j, we suppress the subscript for transparency. Here, we specify an m-th element of β i as
where η im is individual-specific deviation from the mean, which follows a standard normal or log-normal distribution, σ i is a scale heterogeneity, which follows a log-normal distribution, and γ is a mixing parameter that decides the degree of two heterogeneous effects.
13 As for a scaling heterogeneity σ i , we use an exponential operator to avoid negative scaling and τ can be seen as a scaling parameter, because it essentially changes the absolute scale of σ i . we explain the roles of these two heterogeneity parameters below.
In the standard (multinomial) logit model, β im =β m , which implies that all individuals have exactly the same taste for all characteristics. As repeatedly emphasized in this paper, however, the data show heterogeneity in payment choice. Thus, as in equation (2), the model includes two heterogeneity parameters: σ i and η i , where
To see the importance of η i , assume that σ i = 1 and γ = 1. Then, equation (2) 
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The other heterogeneity parameter, σ i , is a scale heterogeneity. To emphasize the importance of σ i , again, assume γ = 0. Then, equation (2) can be rewritten as
As the name suggests, the scale heterogeneity is indeed scaled up or down the valuation for the particular choice, which is constant across m, and can capture the committed users' behavior well.
Notice that this class of model includes a lot of models as special cases, as indicated above. For example, assuming σ i = 1 and β u m = 0 for all m, this model boils down to the simplest (multinomial) logit model. Also, as mentioned above, assuming σ i = 1, this model will be identical to the models in Revelt and Train (1998) and Train (1998), i.e., β im can be simplified as β im =β m + η im , which is the standard mixed logit or heterogeneous logit model. In this study, we assume that γ = 0, which gives us β im = σ i (β m + η im ) and we call σ i a scale heterogeneity and η im random coefficients.
Moreover, we also assume that the variance-covariance matrix of η i is diagonal to ease computational complexity.
A scale coefficient might be explained by the individual demographic information.
For example, credit card users are likely to have high income. Thus, the scale heterogeneity for credit cards might be explained by users' income. Generally speaking, if we want to explain σ with some demographic information, it can be written as
where Q i denotes the individual demographics, such as income or age, which might explain the scale heterogeneity, and β q is a coefficient vector. This seemingly slight change requires huge computational complexity, because we need to findσ that satisfies ∫ 
A Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimator
Given the parameter values θ = {{α j , {β mj , β u mj } m=1,··· ,M j , τ j } j=CC,DC }, where CC and DC denote the credit card and debit card, and a pair of random draws of (ϵ i , η i ) that are fixed over the estimation procedure, we can obtain the analytical choice probability of individual i choosing payment method j at shopping trip t as
where
Notice that the denominator in equation (5) is a summation over available choices.
For example, if a choice set only includes cash and debit card, the denominator is a summation of exponentiated utility from cash usage and debit card usage. Using this 15 In order to identify multiplicative heterogeneity, one of the heterogeneity parameters should be normalized. See Fiebig, Keane, Louviere, and Wasi (2010) . choice probability, the likelihood contribution for each individual is given by:
where d ijt is the observed decision defined by
1, if i choose option j at a shopping trip t, 0, otherwise.
As in equation (6) 
which enables us to define the simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimator given
Notice that the log likelihood value is weighted by w i to correct the sampling bias, as discussed in Section 2. The standard errors reported in this study are calculated by
where s(θ SML ) is a score vector evaluated atθ
SML
. Notice, again, that we need to take into account the sample weight to adjust the sampling bias. Under regularity conditions, this estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal.
Results

Estimation Results
This section provides the estimation results, focusing on the differences among alternative modellings. To emphasize the importance of each heterogeneity, we estimate six variations of the model, summarized in Tables 5 and 6 show the estimation results and some summary statistics. As mentioned in Section 3, we normalize the utility of using cash to zero. Thus, we show the coefficients for credit and debit cards, listing the included variables in the first column of each In terms of the summary statistics, the values of log likelihood, AIC and BIC improve by limiting the choice sets, shifting from Model (i) to Model (ii). Notice that the estimation results for Models (ii) and (iii) are the same, as the objective functions are identical when the models do not have any random coefficients. Although the estimates are the same, the standard errors should be different as indicated in Table 5 .
Parameter Values and Statistics
Thus, without taking into account the unobserved individual-specific effects, the usage of transaction-level and individual-level data should yield the same estimates.
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When we introduce the heterogeneity terms in Models (iv) to (vi), the log likelihood, AIC and BIC further improve dramatically as indicated in on. In Table 6 , 'RC' indicates a random coefficient and the bold numbers indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. Although some random coefficients are statistically insignificant, more than half of the random coefficients are statistically significant, implying that consumers' valuations for payment characteristics are quite heterogeneous.
Debit Cards
Constant
Furthermore, we introduce both random and scale coefficients in Model (vi). Again, most of the parameters are statistically significant.
As for the statistical fitness of the model, we present AIC and BIC at the bottom of Tables 5 and 6 . Models (i) to (iii) force everybody to have homogeneous taste parameters, and these models show relatively larger AIC and BIC than Models (iv) to (vi). Thus, the statistical fitness of the model and the statistical significance of some random coefficient terms indicate the importance of individual heterogeneity. Model (vi) achieves the smallest log-likelihood, AIC, and BIC. These statistics for the fitness of the models are enough for us to proceed to the counterfactual simulations, we also show some predicted probabilities using the estimated models to show other aspects of the fitness of the models. Table 7 demonstrates the overall fitness of the estimated models. Each column shows the shares of cash, credit and debit cards in terms of the frequency (volume) share in the top three rows and value share in the bottom three rows. Since the objective function of the models is based on the individual loglikelihood contribution, we use the weight multiplied by the number of transactions per person. That is, we use w P = w i T i , where T i is the total number of shopping trips that individual i had, and the estimated parameters to calculate the predicted shares.
Predicted Probabilities
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Model (iii) or (vi) can be seen as one of the most promising models in Table 7 , as both models mimic the data quite well in both frequency and values share. At the same time, other models also mimic each share within almost ±1% range. Moreover, even for value shares that we do not match directly in the estimation procedure, these four models mimic the data well. However, Table 8 suggests that Model (iii)
19 Each predicted share can be obtained via:
where R = 1, 000 and each choice probability is given by Equation (5). cannot give good fitness for micro-moments; in particular, the model cannot capture the substitution between cash and debit card. Table 8 shows the fitness of the model conditioned on merchants' acceptance. In the top panel, 'Merchants Accepting Cash and Credit,' we calculate the frequency and value share where merchants accept only cash and credit cards. Unfortunately, all models predict higher numbers for cash usage. On the other hand, in the bottom panel, 'Merchants Accepting Cash and Debit,'
as we include more unobserved heterogeneity, these models capture the substitution between cash and debit cards quite well. For example, cash usage is about 64.22% in the data, and Model (vi) predicts 61.91% for 'Merchants Accepting Cash and Debit.'
These observations allow us to proceed to the counterfactual simulations using these estimated models and parameters.
Simulation Results
Using the estimated model demonstrated above, we conduct a policy simulation where all merchants accept any payment method regardless of transaction values. This question is motivated by policy makers' recent interest in understanding the demand for cash under such a counterfactual scenario, as many recent studies reveal that cash is still a dominant payment method for small-value transactions. Note: As indicated in Table 4 , Model (iii) does not include any individual heterogeneity, whereas Model (iv) includes scale coefficients and Model (v) includes random coefficients. Model (vi) includes both random and scale coefficients. Indicated numbers are frequency and volume shares of each payment method.
Simulation Details
We hypothetically allow consumers to use their credit and debit cards without incurring any additional costs for using them, even though, in reality, they sometimes would not be able to use their cards. We also assume that all consumers can use debit and credit cards. For those consumers who do not have any credit cards, we hypothetically give them a credit card with zero rewards and the lowest credit limit, i.e., $500. For those consumers who do not have any debit cards, we hypothetically
give them a debit card so that they can use their debit cards for any transaction. To conduct this counterfactual experiment, we use the fact that the estimator satisfies asymptotic normality. Thus, we prepare r = 2, 000 sets of normal random draws of ν r and construct θ r =θ +σν r , whereθ andσ denote the estimates and standard errors for the estimates. We also prepare the r = 2, 000 draws for each random coefficient and scale coefficient, (ϵ r , η r ). Then, we simulate the choice probabilities for all methods of payment, whereas consumers' choice sets are restricted by merchants' acceptance in the estimation. Finally, we subtract the former predicted shares from the latter predicted shares. 20 Notice that we use the weight w i here, whereas we use the 'weighted' weight for showing the fitness of the models, as in Tables 7 and 8 , i.e., the predicted shares are calculated via
. Table 9 presents an overview of the simulation results. First, in terms of the frequency, overall cash usage would decrease by 6.9 percentage points to 8.0 percentage points, depending on the model, whereas the transaction amount of cash usage would decrease by 6.9 percentage points to 7.9 percentage points. The most important observation here is that the dominance of cash usage in small-value transactions is driven by consumers -consumers would not decrease their use of cash even if merchants accepted credit and debit cards. Although one might think this change is relatively small, this small overall effect is driven by the fact that many people use cash for small-value transactions even if these merchants accept cards, as indicated in Figure 6 . The right panel of There is one more important remark about 20 As indicated in Table 7 , the predictions from the models cannot predict the data shares exactly.
Overall Effects
Thus, we calculate the difference between predicted shares under the current choice sets and under the counterfactual choice sets. Note: The displayed numbers in 'Model Prediction' columns are percentage point changes which are calculated as the difference between the predicted market share under the current choice sets and the predicted market share under the counterfactual choice sets.
Detailed Effects
Acceptance Types In share. Some mixed users, who wanted to use debit cards but could not because they
were not accepted and used credit cards instead, would use debit cards, which leads to a small decrease in credit usage. However, the number of such mixed users should be small and the effect should be limited. Therefore, we should expect most of the decrease in cash and the Model (vi) support our intuitions. The same thing happens for merchants that accept cash and debit cards.
Last, in the bottom panel, which shows merchants accepting every payment method already, the changes are very limited for any payment method and any model. This is because the merchants have already accepted any payment method and consumers choose their method of payment optimally. Therefore, we should not see huge changes
here and the results validate the models. Table 11 , we show the models' prediction depending on the transaction values. For instance, in the top panel, 'Less than $10,' we calculate the percentage point change only for the transactions which are less than $10. Though the market share of cash in the data is quite huge for less than $10 transactions, the percentage change is small. On the other hand, transactions between $10 and $25, the decreases are about 10 percentage points, even though the original market share is much smaller than less than $10 transactions. Therefore, these observations support that the results -cash usage in small-value transactions is driven by consumers -is Note: The displayed numbers in 'Model Prediction' columns are percentage point changes which are calculated as the difference between the predicted market share under the current choice sets and the predicted market share under the counterfactual choice sets.
Transaction Values In
robust. Note: The displayed numbers in 'Model Prediction' columns are percentage point changes which are calculated as the difference between the predicted market share under the current choice sets and the predicted market share under the counterfactual choice sets.
Some Discussions
As mentioned in Sections 2 and 3, there may exist some potential endogenity problems in the estimation and the counterfactual simulation. We summarize and discuss them briefly in this section.
Measurement Errors in Perceived Acceptance and Endogeneity
First, we use the reported perceived acceptance data, which may have measurement errors, since consumers tend to go to merchants that are likely to accept their preferred method of payment and report inaccurately about acceptance of their non-preferred method of payment. Unfortunately, in these data, we cannot verify whether their reported acceptances are correct. However, as in Table 3 , we do have a number of observations where some merchants accept only credit cards or debit cards, which validate the accuracy of data. Thus, this paper uses their reported perceived acceptance without any imputation.
This perceived acceptance might create a bias in the counterfactual experiment.
In particular, when we measure the welfare gain in the counterfactual experiment, we might underestimate it. As indicated in Table 3 , currently many consumers choose shops that accept their preferred method of payment, e.g., credit users are more likely to go to merchants that accept credit cards. However, under the counterfactual scenario, they would not have to choose merchants by their acceptance. Since this paper does not measure the welfare gain/loss, this problem cannot be a major concern.
There might be another concern of a selection problem of credit cards. As Arango, Huynh, and Sabetti (2011) investigate, those consumers who tend to use their credit cards are likely to have good reward programs on their cards. Under the couterfactual scenario, some cash users and debit users might obtain new credit cards which have better reward programs and start using them. This model cannot capture such behavior, as their credit card selection behavior is not explicitly modelled. Therefore, the results indicated above should be interpret as a short term effect where consumers continue to use the same credit cards.
Supply Effects and Externalities
Finally, this paper cannot capture any externalities in the counterfactual simulation. For example, as a result of forcing merchants to accept electronic cards, merchants might get used to processing cards and therefore the speed of settlement for these cards would be faster than before. Observing this faster settlement for cards, consumers might use cards more frequently. This is one of the externalities for forcing merchants to accept cards.
Moreover, the models do not take into account merchants' behavior nor the behav-ior of credit and debit card network providers. They might potentially change their behavior, in particular, they might charge higher interchange and surcharge fees to exploit their monopolistic or oligopolistic market power. To fully predict what would happen if merchants were forced to accept cards, we need to take into account their behavior.
Conclusion
This paper investigates consumers' method of payment choices. To exploit the individual heterogeneity in payment choice, we use a generalized multinomial logit model, taking advantage of the data where we can observe multiple transactions for each individual. Moreover, "perceived" acceptance, which partially gives supply-side information, enables us to separately identify demand-side factors from the supply-side factors. Estimation results confirm that such unobserved heterogeneity in method of payment choice is indeed significant both statistically and economically. Using the estimated model, we conduct the counterfactual simulation where all merchants accept cards regardless of transaction values. Simulation results show that cash usage would indeed decrease but the magnitude is quite limited: cash usage decreases at most about 8 percentage points in frequency share. The implication of this result is that current cash usage is driven by demand-side factors -consumers prefer using cash, in particular, for small-value transactions.
As this paper focuses on consumer's method of payment choice, we abstract from other potential issues listed in Section 4. Considering issues, e.g., competition among network providers or measurement error in choice sets, would be an interesting extension for future research. some problems. However, as Figure 7 indicates, the distributions of transaction values look similar. We might be able to impute the acceptance based on transaction values, the number of cashiers at each merchant, and shopping type. However, we will not take this approach as this perceived acceptance is one of the key variables and it seems there is no systematic correlation at least for transaction values.
Finally, for identification purposes, we drop 884 individuals with 1,312 transactions, since they had only one or two shopping records. This final operation yields 1,452 individuals with 7,908 transactions. Again, we also show two distributions for transaction values, which stay in the sample and are dropped from the sample in Figure   8 . These two kernel density estimates suggest that both distributions are similar and we can estimate the models with 1,452 individuals without any problems, since they are representative. Note: The black solid line shows the distribution of transaction values that we use for this paper and the blue dotted line shows the distribution of transaction values that we drop from our estimation samples.
